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In late 2017, I approached the publishers Rowman and Littlefield with a proposal for a book 
on the latest work on conspiracy theory theory (the study of conspiracy theory), which 
would take as its basis a series of replies and counters to an opinion piece first published in 
Le Monde. “Luttons efficacement contre les théories du complot” (Bronner et al. 2016) was 
the work of Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian 
Dieguez, Karen Douglas, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger, and 
it set in motion a fascinating commentary on the rationality of conspiracy theory in the pages 
of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 
 
What’s Past is Prologue 
 
Given the nature of these exchanges, I had hoped that Bronner et al. would contribute to the 
edited volume. After all (sans Karen Douglas) they had responded to an open letter written 
by Lee Basham and myself (Basham and Dentith 2016), which had been signed by a number 
of philosophers, sociologists, and a psychologist (Dieguez et al. 2016). However, as an email 
from Sebastian Dieguez stated, none of the authors wanted to take part in said project (pers 
comms). 
 
As such, I was surprised that several months after the publication of Taking Conspiracy 
Theories Seriously (M. R. X. Dentith 2018b) some of the original authors of the original Le 
Monde piece decided to respond after all. Pascal Wagner-Egger, Gérald Bronner, Sylvain 
Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, and Nicolas Gauvrit (not only sans Karen Douglas, but now 
also Anthony Lantian and Véronique Campion-Vincent) wrote a piece entitled “Why 
‘Healthy Conspiracy Theories’ Are (Oxy)morons” (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019). I was even 
more surprised by the incoherence of the piece in question, in part because of internal 
contradictions in their own arguments, but also because they mischaracterised my own work 
(and not for the first time). If I was a suspicious person I would have put this down to 
malice. Yet not being suspicious I also cannot fathom how serious academics as themselves 
would fail to check their own work before committing it to publication. 
 
“Weapons of Massive Destructions” 
 
Let me start with a simple error. Wagner-Egger, et al. claim that: “If we did not miss any 
other, Basham and Dentith cite only one (!) conspiracy theory that turned out to be true: the 
US/UK Weapons of Massive [sic] Destructions [sic]” (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 51). I do 
not even need to state this is false, because they almost immediately follow that sentence 
with the following parenthetical: “(Basham & Dentith enumerate for example the beginnings 
of holocaust, Stalin, US army in Vietnam, the Watergate, or Litvinenko case[)]” (Wagner-
Egger et al. 2019, 51). 
 
So, which is it? Do we state only one warranted conspiracy theory (a claim which is false) or 
many (a claim which is true)?1 
                                               
1 Even odder is their claim this the “main” argument for “healthy conspiracy theorizing” is the “US/UK 
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This is all the more confusing as earlier on in their piece they seem to deny that the “US/UK 
Weapons of Mass Destructions” theory is a conspiracy theory at all. They write that said 
conspiracy theory: 
 
[A]ccused US and UK armies to have invaded Iraq in 2003, not as they claim 
because of the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction—which 
were finally not found, and led the US and UK governments to 
recognize their "error" [emphasis added]—but in reality, to gain control on 
a strategic region for oil industry (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 50). 
 
Behold here a rewriting of history in order to make a theory about a conspiracy disappear. 
Those who are politically literate will be doubtlessly aware that part-and-parcel of the 
rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003ACE was the creation of a doctored (sometimes 
called “dodgy”) dossier by the British which sought to show that—despite not just a lack of 
evidence on the ground but also the assurances of UN Weapons Inspectors—that there 
really were Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. It was not that these weapons 
were “finally not found” which led the US and the UK to “recognize their ‘error’.” It was 
that these two governments manufactured consent through the production of fake evidence. 
Now, you can dispute how conspiratorial this dodgy dossier was: for some the dossier is 
clear evidence that the Plan for a New American Century was going according to schedule; 
others have argued that UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush 
really did think they would find the WMDs and thought once they were found the creation 
of the dossier would be but a footnote.2 
 
What you probably should not do is rewrite history to make the problem of the “US/UK 
Weapons of Mass Destructions” conspiracy theory disappear, and you certainly should not 
claim it is the only example we used when you almost immediately admit we cited others as 
well. 
 
You shouldn’t also present it both as a conspiracy theory which is true, and not a conspiracy 
theory at all, but c’est la vie. 
 
Indeed, given Wagner-Egger, et al. list of the supposed inadequacies of conspiracy theorists, 
which they associate with the errors of conspiracist ideation, you could view this sloppy kind 
of argument as a special kind of conspiracism, one suffered by a certain kind of conspiracy 
theory theorist (someone who studies conspiracy theory) who steadfastly sticks to some view 
despite the very evidence they present in favour of it indicating otherwise. Indeed, given the 
issue of how they mischaracterise my work, maybe the real problem with conspiracism is it is 
                                                                                                                                            
Moscow Show Trials as chief example, whilst Lee Basham likes to talk about the Gulf of Tonkin Affair, or the 
Atomic Energy Commission covering up the dangers of atomic testing. Charles Pigden is fond of Elizabethan 
plots, and so forth. So, to say this one conspiracy theory is the main argument is to ignore our actual main 
arguments. 
2 This version of the story can be finessed even further by claiming that Bush and Blair preferred the findings 
of certain intelligence agency senior officials over that of staff on the ground. However, given what happened, 
charity seems an unnecessary virtue. 
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rooted in part of the community of conspiracy theory theorists, rather than amongst 
conspiracy theorists per se… 
 
Public Conspiracy Theories 
 
Let us, for the moment, ignore Wagner-Eggers, et al. and their confused view on the 
“US/UK Weapons of Mass Destruction” conspiracy theory, or that they think their critics 
only give one example or many. After all, Wagner-Egger also add to the list of warranted 
conspiracy theories, noting that they would: “[A]dd the MK-Ultra project, Tuskegee 
experiments, the Tobacco conspiracy, etc.)” (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 51). 
 
But they then go on to say: 
 
As Popper underlined, successful conspiracies are rare in history (16). 
Moreover, and this is a crucial point, all these proved conspiracies did not rely 
on preceding public conspiracy theories. They were discovered by genuine 
journalistic, police or judicial investigations. Thus, at best, we know very few 
conspiracy theories that became true (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 51). 
 
The claim these “did not rely on preceding public conspiracy theories” is an odd one. If we 
accept that by saying they would add to our list, then several of the warranted conspiracy 
theories we presented were preceded by public conspiracy theories. 
 
Now, let us pause a moment and try to work out what they mean by “public conspiracy 
theories.” What they seem to be intimating here is the claim none of these warranted 
conspiracy theories existed in a pre-warranted state: that is, the conspiracy theories in 
question first appeared in public discourse as warranted. 
 
This is not true, however. Leaving to one side the “US/UK Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
conspiracy theory 3 ), the Moscow Show Trials (presumably the target of their reference to 
“Stalin”) are a problem for them. After all, the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made 
against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials (also known as “The Dewey Commission”) may well 
have been made up of educated people, but the findings were labeled both “disinformation” 
and a “conspiracy theory” (of the unwarranted kind) by both the West and Russia (at least 
until Stalin’s death). The Watergate Affair was also laughed at by the media and politicians 
for years before becoming a respectable thing to believe about what happened at the 
Watergate Hotel. The Iran-Contra Affair is another example of a warranted conspiracy 
theory where journalists (like Robert Parry) and politicians (such as John Kerry) were 
smeared for spreading the story both before and after it was taken to be well-established. 
 
Perhaps what Wagner-Egger, et al. really mean by “public conspiracy theory” is that none of 
the theories in question publicly circulated as conspiracy theories before being shown to be 
                                               
3 A warranted conspiracy theory long before the governments of the US and UK admitted to having misled the 
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true. That seems to be the only way to make sense of their standard, but this is surely worse. 
That means that if anyone suspected the conspiracies before they were made “public,” then 
any belief in such theories before the “proper” investigations were undertaken would just 
automatically be rendered as false. Which means that, somehow, Bob Woodward and Carl 
Bernstein were vapid conspiracy theorists at one stage of the investigation in the Watergate 
Affair, but warranted conspiracy “inquirers” at some latter point. Meanwhile, Robert Parry 
would have had the distinction of being both being a vapid and warranted investigator into 
some conspiracy theory, given that once the Iran-Contra story broke, people still continued 
to cast doubt about it. 
 
This is an example of building in a pejorative definition of “conspiracy theory” into an 
argument, rather than working with a value neutral definition. They restrict the domain of 
warranted conspiracy theories to a small number, in order to get to Karl Popper’s argument 
about the irrationality of belief in the conspiracy theory of society which has—as a central tenet—
the claim that conspiracies are rare and seldom successful (Popper 1969). That is, there are 
few warranted cases of conspiracy, and thus conspiracy theories will greatly outnumber 
them. 
 
Now, in one sense they are right: there are (probably) more unwarranted than warranted 
conspiracy theories because—as a rule—there are usually more unwarranted theories than 
there are warranted ones generally. In the Sciences, for example, new scientific theories are 
generated pretty much constantly, but only a small proportion of them survive scrutiny. The 
same is true in the social sciences (like, say, psychology), and the Arts (historical theories are 
proposed all the time, but not all historical theses end up being widely accepted). As such, 
Wagner-Egger, et al. might be right, but only in a really trivial sense. But if we accept this 
trivial sense of unwarranted theories outnumbering warranted theories as a serious issue, 
then it is a serious issue for all theories, and not just conspiracy theories. 
 
Which is why we should talk about the salience of examples, rather than the number of 
them. As Wagner-Egger, et al. would seem to admit, there are a number of conspiracy 
theories which have turned out to be true, and many of these conspiracy theories concerned 
governmental malfeasance. Which, unless you think governmental malfeasance is a good 
thing, is something we ought to be on the look out for. A healthy democracy requires 
vigilance, after all. 
 
Occam and Hanlon’s Razors 
 
Part-and-parcel of Wagner-Eggers, et al. argument about the unhealthy nature of conspiracy 
theorising is a weird insistence on how we should apply Occam and Hanlon’s Razors. 
Occam’s Razor says we should prefer the least complicated explanation, all things being equal, 
whilst Hanlon’s Razor counsels us to never ascribe to malice what could be explained by a 
cock-up. 
 
Both Occam and Hanlon are useful guides for choosing between competing theories or 
views in situations where we have to make quick decisions. They are, however, heuristics, 
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and not fundamental laws of argument. Yet Wagner-Egger misrepresent them, saying: “[B]y 
virtue of the scientific principle of Occam’s razor, simpler hypotheses have always to be 
preferred [Emphasis mine] to more complicated ones in order to explain any phenomenon” 
(Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 52). Yet the Razors are ceteris paribus clauses: we apply them in 
cases of “all other things being equal” rather than in all cases.  
 
This is an important point: Occam’s Razor, for example, says we should prefer simpler 
explanations over complex explanations in cases where the more complicated explanation offers no 
significant advantages. If a rival, more complicated explanation also has the explanatory virtue 
of explaining new and novel phenomena, for example, or makes unique and testable 
predictions, then we might well have grounds to prefer the more complicated theory. 
Indeed, the story of how we moved from one theoretical model in physics to another over 
the course of the 20th century is wrapped up in accepting that much more complicated 
physical models (at least compared to their predecessors) ended up also being richer 
theoretical models with respect to solving existing physical puzzles, whilst also successfully 
predicting novel phenomena. 
 
Now, it may be the case that some conspiracy theories are more complex explanations than 
their rivals, although it is not clear this is always the case: the coincidence theory, for 
example, that says the various pro-Brexit campaigns did not collude with one another in the 
run-up to the Brexit referendum in the UK seems to require several leaps of faith, leaps 
which makes such an explanation much more complicated and unwieldy than thinking 
certain key figures in the campaign conspired to get around campaign finance rules. But even 
in cases where a conspiracy theory is more complicated than some rival explanation it might 
still be the best explanation (as it was in the case of the Moscow Trials: Stalin and his cronies 
really did engineer the verdicts in the trial despite the Soviet claim at the time the simplest 
explanation was that they really had uncovered a Trotskyist plot). 
 
In the same respect, Hanlon’s Razor says we should never attribute to malice what can be 
explained by stupidity all things being equal. If we were to take Hanlon’s Razor as a prescription 
we would never be able to justify any claim of malicious conspiracy because, well, we should 
just assume the supposed conspirators were stupid. Thus, Stalin and his cronies—when they 
engineered the guilty verdicts in the Moscow Trials—were, according to Wagner-Egger and 
co. it seems, merely stupidly and coincidentally getting people to perjure themselves on the 
witness stand (which, I might remind you, lead to the death of many of them), rather than 
maliciously creating the appearance of a conspiracy against Stalin and his regime in order to 
justify more political purges. 
 
Occam and Hanlon’s Razors are guides. They are not stipulations. They are employed in 
order to help us to make quick decisions in the absence of having to do a lot of cognitive 
work. They should not been seen as prescriptive. 
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Communities of Inquiry 
 
According to Wagner-Egger, et al., in the final chapter of Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously, I: 
“[A]bandon the concepts of conspiracy theory (and theorizing) in favor of ‘communities of 
inquiry,’ which is close to what we called here conspiracy inquiry (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 
61). Before I explain why this is not only not true, but gross misrepresentation of my work, 
let me explain what it is they mean by “conspiracy inquiry.” 
 
Wagner-Egger, et al. think that healthy conspiracy theorising (the position they ascribe to the 
participating authors of Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously) is an oxy-moron because: 
 
[C]onspiracy theories may in our view be defined as irrational suspicions of 
conspiracy based on errant data about the official version (“negative” clues). 
They are opposed to (conspiracy) inquiries, which possibly prove the 
existence of a particular conspiracy (with once again sound journalistic or 
judicial investigations, and positive proofs of the conspiracy such as 
confessions, official documents, leaks, whistleblowers, etc.; note that these 
proofs could be also in principle brought by non professionals, but perhaps 
with less likelihood) (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019, 60–61). 
 
That is, it is unhealthy to theorise about conspiracies, but it can be healthy to inquire into 
them. 
 
Put simply like that, this is obviously nonsense. To achieve their distinction they have to 
construct a portrait of the conspiracy theorist as a poorly-served figure both epistemically 
and psychologically, whilst offering paeans to a class of persons who apparently inquire into 
conspiracies properly. That is, they retroactively justify their suspicion of these things called 
“conspiracy theories” by looking for evidence conspiracy theorists are irrational. 
 
I have argued as to why this move effectively means working backwards elsewhere (see, for 
example, my chapter in “Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them” (2018a)) 
but, in short, starting work with a pejorative gloss of either “conspiracy theory” or 
“conspiracy theorist” prejudices our theoretical work by building into it the notion belief in 
conspiracy theories is prima facie irrational. Our work would be much more fruitful (and less 
determined by unexamined “common sense notions”) if we started with a value-neutral 
definition of “conspiracy theory” that admitted that, yes, some conspiracy theorising can be 
healthy. 
 
After all, it is not as if my colleagues think all conspiracy theorising is healthy; just that some 
of it is, contra the claims of our critics (who think we have prima facie grounds to be 
suspicious of conspiracy theories generally). We simply think you can’t assume a conspiracy 
theory is suspicious just because it is (or has been labelled) a conspiracy theory. 
 
So, to claim that I also advocate something close to this approach goes against my published 
research. Due to reservations about the back-to-front way in which authors like Wagner-
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Eggers, et al. define conspiracy theorising and conspiracy theorists (given they seem to start 
with the notion conspiracy theories are irrational to believe by definition, and thus seek 
evidence to show that conspiracy theorists must thus be acting irrationally if they believe 
conspiracy theories), I do not share their pejorative take on conspiracy theorists or 
conspiracy theorising. Inquiring into a conspiracy is to theorise about a conspiracy, and vice 
versa. 
 
More galling, however, is that their claim that I seem to have abandoned the concepts of 
conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorising is also clearly denied by the very chapter they 
are referring to. For example, I ask: “What motivates the investigation of a conspiracy 
theory” (2018c, 218)? and go on to talk about that investigation, arguing that: “[F]ew—if 
any—of us have the requisite expertise to assess any given particular conspiracy theory fully 
anyway” (2018c, 218).  
 
When I speak of inquiries I speak of communities of inquiry: “After all, any community of 
inquiry into a particular conspiracy theory needs to be made up of not just diverse people 
with respect to things like expertise but also with regard to their attitudes towards conspiracy 
theories” (2018c, 221–2). 
 
This talk of a community of inquiry owes itself to the work of John Dewey (1938) and C. S. 
Pierce (1958), and by it I am referring to a collective way to investigate conspiracy theories, 
one which allows us to share the epistemic load of taking such theories seriously enough to 
want to understand whether they are warranted or unwarranted. It is a method to inquire 
into these things called “conspiracy theories” and not, as Wagner-Egger, et al. would have 
you believe, an attempt to move away from talk of conspiracy theory generally. Indeed, as I 
state near the end of the chapter: “Taking conspiracy theories seriously and investigating 
them does not tell us that a given community of inquiry will end up endorsing any particular 
conspiracy theory. It simply tells us that they might” (2018c, 224). 
 
So, whilst I talk about communities of inquiry I talk about them inquiring into conspiracy theories. 
There is no way to read that chapter (or the other chapters I authored or co-authored in the 
same volume) which suggests in anyway that I am abandoning talk of conspiracy theory or 
conspiracy theorising in favour of Wagner-Egger’s notion of “conspiracy inquiries.” 
 
This is not, unfortunately, the first time these authors have mischaracterised my work. In an 
earlier piece they wrote that I seemed “very worried by those he calls ‘conspiracists’” 
(Dieguez et al. 2016, 26), referring to my paper “The Problem of Conspiracism.” Yet, as 
Martin Orr and I noted in our reply to that piece (2017), it seems like they had not read the 
article in question, given I state: 
 
It might also be the case that once we investigate Conspiracism, it will turn 
out to be a fairly useless thesis, especially if there are not many (if any) actual 
conspiracists. However, if we are going to treat the thesis of Conspiracism 
seriously—and investigate it—we need to keep in mind that conspiracists are 
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conspiracists does not tell us that belief in conspiracy theories generally is 
problematic. The question should be “When, if ever, is a conspiracy theorist 
a conspiracist?” rather than presupposing that conspiracy theorists suffer 
from conspiracist ideation (Dentith 2018, 341). 
 
Hardly the words of someone who is “very worried” about conspiracists or conspiracism. 
As I said earlier in the article, if I was suspicious then I would take this as malicious: an 
attempt to make it look as if my work is inconsistent. Yet it is also hard to imagine that 
Wagner-Egger, et al. would not at least check to see if their reading or characterisation of 
another academic’s work is right. It is also not the case I was the only person whose work 
was mischaracterised: they did they same to Ginna Husting and Martin Orr (2017, 10), as 
well as Kurtis Hagen (2017). 
 
Robust academic debate requires both sides to engage with one another in good faith. 
Misrepresenting the opposing side does not inspire confidence in one’s critique. 
 
Of course, it suits Wagner-Egger, et al. to suggest that I am abandoning conspiracy theory in 
favour of conspiracy inquiry because if it can be shown that a someone like me is giving up 
on “healthy conspiracy theorising,” then they can let their readers assume that it is our 
project which is the one running into problems. So, let us turn the tables a little. 
 
Given Wagner-Egger, et al. are responding to Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously as a whole, 
and the final chapter where I sketch out a community of inquiry approach to investigating 
conspiracy theories, surely it is they who are giving up ground. Indeed, the tenor of their 
replies4 since Lee Basham and I penned the joint letter (2016) has gone from condemning 
even asking questions about conspiracy theories (Bronner et al. 2016), to then claiming “We 
were just asking questions” (Dieguez et al. 2016) to now saying “Well, inquiring into claims of 
conspiracy is probably okay...” (Wagner-Egger et al. 2019). 
 
As such, it is they who seem to be abandoning their previous position on conspiracy theory 
and conspiracy theorising, using that common tactic to a certain class of conspiracy theory 
theorist: renaming a key term in order to make their position look principled. We have seen 
this before: Lance deHaven-Smith did this with his notion of the “State Crimes Against 
Democracy” (AKA the SCAD), which was an attempt to avoid the pejorative gloss of 
“conspiracy theory” by renaming the conspiracy theories he thought we ought to take 
seriously as SCADs (2013). However, as deHaven-Smith later came to admit, this tactic was 
not fruitful. As he argues: “A better approach may be to avoid trying to find an acceptable 
name and definition for illegitimate or criminal forms of political intrigue, and instead develop 
criteria and procedures for identifying specific events” (2013). 
 
                                               
4 As Lee Basham notes, each reply they write seems to lose a few members from the original consortium which 
wrote the Le Monde piece (2019), which maybe suggests some people have been willing to accept genuine 
criticism of their views with good grace. 
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After all, changing the label on a thing or practice does not change that thing or practice. 
Years ago the Government of Aotearoa New Zealand and a consortium of kiwifruit growers 
tried to rebrand the kiwifruit to “Zespri” in order to make it more marketable. Yet everyone 
still knew what a “Zespri” was: it was a kiwifruit.5 In the same respect, labelling the kind of 
conspiracy theorising you approve of as being a “conspiracy inquiry” does not change the 
fact someone is still theorising about a conspiracy… 
 
The “Conspiracism” of the Conspiracy Theory Theorists 
 
The academic scholarship on conspiracy theory theory is still young, and it is understandable 
that certain theorists are interested in protecting their research findings in the face of 
growing body of evidence which indicates that certain central assumptions inherent to that 
research ought to be questioned. As such, perhaps we should rethink conspiracism not as a 
fault inherent to conspiracy theorists but, rather, a puzzling attitude held by a certain class of 
conspiracy theory theorist, those who incoherently argue for the claim conspiracy theorising 
is unhealthy. 
 
I jest, but I think the point is clear: if you are arguing that healthy conspiracy theorising is a 
problem, then you ought to ensure that your own views are not also problematic. That is, 
you should ensure that the faults you ascribe to conspiracy theorists are not also faults in 
your own arguments and views. After all, like the unhealthy conspiracy theorists they are so 
concerned with, Wagner-Eggers, et al. defame the innocent (their repeated 
mischaracterisation of the views of people they disagree with), they argue incoherently (they 
claim their critics use only one, yet also many examples of warranted conspiracy theories), 
they cherry-pick evidence to support their views (their version of WMD story of the 
invasion of Iraq), they ignore the work of experts (the UN Weapons Inspectors) and prefer 
partisan sources (US and UK government officials). As such, they can be seen to be the ones 
contributing to a degenerating research programme, which speaks to their characterisation of 
“unhealthy conspiracy theorizing” simply being a projection of their own conspiracism, 
rather than a consequence of actually following the evidence. 
 
We surely should expect better. As someone well-versed in the conspiracy theory theory 
literature, I am aware that many of my colleagues who are concerned about the negative 
consequences of belief in conspiracy theories have principled objections to the kind of work 
that Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously represents. Indeed, these objections are being hashed 
out in articles as well as collaborative work; many of us are friends enough to enjoy a drink 
together even if we push back strongly at each other’s work in print. That is because we trust 
that—despite academic disagreement on conspiracy theory—we will honestly and sincerely 
critique each other’s arguments, rather than mischaracterise the work. In this respect Wager-
Eggers, et al. need to do better. 
 
                                               
5 Non-New Zealand readers might well know the “kiwifruit” as a “kiwi.” However, that is the name of our 
national bird (which some of you will know as as a “kiwi bird”). Names and labels are strange, and changing 
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